What exactly was decided on June 29 in Niamey? It is permissible to question both the different
sometimes contradictory declarations since that day have sown confusion in public opinion.
In order to untangle the skein, let's go back to February 21, 2018. We are in Accra and the august city
Ghanaian country hosts a meeting of the presidential task force in charge of the implementation of the
single currency. Particularly perky, President Nana Akufo-Addo, host of the meeting and great
promoter of the project, multiplies the enthusiastic declarations. In particular, he asserts that "the introduction of a
single currency in West Africa will, among other things, help to remove trade barriers and
monetary, reduce transaction costs... and that many cannot accept that these are only
Asians who can successfully transition from poverty to prosperity in one generation”. From
silences and contradictions In the concert of exalted declarations of this day, a dissonant voice, and
not just any will be heard. Godwin Emefiele, head of the powerful central bank of
Nigeria and representing President Muhammadu Buhari at this meeting will point out the unpreparedness of some
countries, the significant macroeconomic disparities that streak ECOWAS and the watering down of the criteria for
convergence, passed immediately from eleven to six. But the Nigerian banker will go even further and
publicly demand that the WAEMU states present a roadmap for the "unbundling" of the treasury
French audience. Heavy with meaning, the words of the governor of the CBN will however pass at the time
relatively unnoticed. A year and a half later, on June 29, the ECOWAS Heads of State meeting in
Niamey endorse a flexible exchange rate regime with a targeting-based monetary policy framework
of inflation. Finally, they retain the term Eco as the name of the single currency. This time no voice
dissonant is not heard; then on July 9, 2019, President Alassane Ouattara will come out of the woodwork: since
Paris, the Ivorian leader will declare that “eventually the CFA franc will be called the Eco”. Then a few more days
later, on July 12 during a UEMOA summit, he will squarely contradict the Niamey press release by
assuring that "if the Eco were to come into execution or adoption in 2020, there will be no change in
parity between the Fcfa, which has become Eco, and the euro, declared Ouattara. Today, the euro exchange rate per
to the CFA franc is 655.9, and of course, if the heads of state decide next year to change the
Fcfa in Eco, because we have respected all the convergence criteria, this rate would not change
immediately”. In two weeks, we went from a single currency with a flexible exchange rate to
a currency starting in 2020 with the fixed parity between the current CFA and the euro. But there are also the unsaid
from Niamey. The final communiqué explicitly addresses issues of the exchange rate regime, policy
currency and the name of the currency. The convertibility of this currency with its African counterparts and
global? the reserve management policy? The place and the beginning of printing of this new stallion? Not
a word. What hides all these silences and contradictions? A "consensus", in the absence of unanimity
ECOWAS actually seems to be traversed by classic struggles for influence shaking up any construction of
common currency area. Silences at best and contradictions at worst on issues related to
central bank government, setting monetary policy, managing reserves, issuing
monetary policy are due to the now public disagreements between the countries of the zone. Within ECOWAS, it
an apparent schism is emerging, suggesting two groups of states. On the one hand, the group of countries of
WAEMU sharing the CFA franc. Strengthened by the stability provided by the much maligned CFA franc, they are
cautious about embarking on an adventure that completely upsets their monetary principles and
dominated head and shoulders by the Nigerian juggernaut. So they use the precondition
convergence criteria. Claiming to be the only ones to fill them to date, they try to take speed
the Nigerian giant by starting in 2020 with the proven principles of the operation of the CFA franc.
On the other side, the group of other ECOWAS countries led by Nigeria wants to impose its views
overall monetary. They rely on the imposing economic and demographic weight of the latter and
of their own monetary experience which is clearly different from that of the WAEMU. On the basis of this reading, the
Governor Emefiele's exit following the February 2018 meeting in Accra is gaining new light. The Nigerian giant does not trust its WAEMU peers about their ability to exit cooperation
French currency structuring the CFA. The common currency assuming, among other things, the constitution of a
inherently managed common reserve system, it is not imaginable for Nigeria that the fringe of
community reserves belonging to the UEMOA are partly lodged within the public treasury of a State
foreigner, which is moreover a former colonial power of the said countries. Autonomously piloting its policy
monetary policy for decades with a flexible exchange rate, Nigeria weighs 73.1% of the GDP of
the whole of ECOWAS and will not allow its attitude to be dictated in the construction of this union
monetary. The outcome of this dissensus poses a heavy risk of an explosion of the long-awaited currency project
single ECOWAS. Without at least the dissociation of the French public treasury, the Eco if it were to see the light of day would be
only with UEMOA countries. What would be a purely cosmetic change from the much-criticized
CFA franc, leaving the peoples of the WAEMU zone very sad. From this point of view, it is interesting to
to note that cooperation with the French public treasury is precisely the most attacked facet of the franc
CFA. Critics of the WAEMU currency see this measure as proof of control
French and it is no coincidence that this is one of the points on which Nigeria focuses its demands.
What would WAEMU countries have to gain from adopting the Eco as announced in Niamey? At the level of
inflation-oriented monetary policy, no changes coming, as the BCEAO pursues the same objective.
The flexible exchange rate regime, on the other hand, would give flexibility to the WAEMU countries locked into a
fixed exchange rate with the single euro. This prevents them from adapting to the vagaries of the global economy
nevertheless very influential given the essentially exporting profile of the countries in the zone. It's all about reality
on the right level where to put the slider of the exchange rate so that no one is harmed. This question will be
facilitated by greater convergence of the economies of the zone. The deterioration of this harmonization
clearly observed in Niamey, if we add to this the muted struggles for influence at work and the
left unsaid of this famous meeting, we can affirm without much fear that West Africa will not
won't hold Eco in its hands in 2020.